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Abstract
A decision is an act or event of decision taking. Decision making always in-
cludes decision taking, the latter not involving significant exchanges with
non-deciding agents. A decision outcome is a piece of storable informa-
tion constituting the result of a decision. Decision outcomes are typed,
for instance: plan, command, assertion, or boolean reply to a question.
Decision outcomes are seen by an audience and autonomous actions from
the audience is supposed to realize the putting into effect of a decision
outcome, thus leading to so-called decision effects.
Decision outcomes are supposedly expected by the decider. Using a
model or a theory concerning the causal chain leading from a decision
outcome to one or more decision effects may support a decision taker
decision taker in predicting plausible decision effects for candidate decision
outcomes.
Decision taking is positioned amidst many related notions including:
decision making, decision process, decision making process, decision pro-
cess making, decision engineering, decision progression, and decision pro-
gression production.
∗Author’s email address: j.a.bergstra@uva.nl. This paper is a revised version of [9].
A subtitle has been added which indicates the experimental flavor of the work. The title
might have been adapted by changing “Informatics Perspectives” into “Informaticological
Perspectives” (for a justification of the term informaticology see [11]), which I now consider
to be more adequate than the actual title, but I have preferred not to change the title for
reasons of consistency. Many minor improvements have been applied, and a terminology for
choice making has been included, moreover the concluding remarks were updated. The first
version of the paper has been written in the context of the NWO Jaquard project Symbiosis
which focuses on software asset outsourcing and on IT outsourcing in general. The objective to
analyze outsourcing decisions (see [29]) and follow-up outsourcing decisions (see [4]) requires
a preparatory investigation of decision taking in general. The work on decision taking will be
more general than the intended application to IT sourcing issues requires it to be.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to conceptualize the notion of a decision by making
use of a number of techniques and concepts from informatics. In particular a
decision will be defined as a tuple of components of various types, which is a
common style of introducing a concept in informatics.1 This leads to a so-called
constructing definition of “decision” in the terminology of [10]. I will propose to
view decision making as an informatics competence for the simple reason that
the decision outcome primarily constitutes a piece of information. I will use the
terminology as well as the definitions of [15] concerning competence and ability.
That terminology includes the notions of a framework competence, a community
confirmed competence, an evidence based ability, a competence profile, and of
a conjectural ability. Each of these notions will require instantiation to the
decision taking context.
Readers who have read and reflected upon Sections 2 and 3 below, will be
said to have acquired a decision taking framework competence. This puts them
in the intended audience for taking notice of the constructing definition of de-
cision as given in Section 4.1, as well as the subsequent theory development.
According to [15] a competence profile consists of a number of community con-
firmed competences, which may be but need not be evidence based, possibly
augmented with one or more evidence based abilities lacking community confir-
mation, and possibly augmented with one or more conjectural abilities, which
are lacking by definition of being conjectural both an evidence base and com-
munity confirmation. The conceptualization of “decision” below, together with
some of its consequences qualifies as a “theory of decision taking”, which is ad-
mittedly incomplete and of a limited scope. In addition I will provide specific
1For instance although the notion of an automaton sounds familiar to most people, in
informatics an automaton will be defined to constitute a tuple of interrelated items of various
types.
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proposals concerning conjectural abilities concerning decision taking which can
be considered plausible consequences of a person’s awareness this theory.
In [46] the observation is made that decision making research mainly stands
on two feet: description and prescription.2 Description calls for observation
and invites the development of theory which may or may not be confirmed
by observation. Prescription may lead to improved behaviors not previously
observed, or to a more frequent occurrence of best practice. Prescription should
be analyzed from the perspective of a theoretical framework that supposedly
explains why prescribed patterns (of decision making) are to be preferred. Nutt
[46] indicates that action theory combines description and prescription.
I will pursue construction as an alternative approach to concept analysis
which is standing on an equal footing with description and prescription. Decision
is thought of as an idealized concept, found by means of a constructing definition,
independent of any empirical observation, and without any intention for being
prescriptive. The constructing definition of decision can be used by readers who
are willing to forget about their prior intuition about decision, and to reconsider
the notion in such a way that unexpected consequences may result, that is some
events that were not thought of as decisions may turn out to be regarded as
decisions and conversely.
1.1 Disambiguating process product ambiguities
This paper may be considered a case study in the disambiguation of a so-called
process product ambiguity. Many important terms and phrases somehow refer
at the same time to the result of a process as well as to the very process leading to
that result. According to [58] such ambiguities are visible already in elementary
mathematics. Remarkably, according to [33] resolving of such ambiguities, which
can be done by choosing one of several meanings as a preferred meaning for a
term, is not necessarily a step forward in mastering a theme.
Nevertheless I hold that: (i) at least in some cases process product ambiguity
stands in the way of a better understanding of a topic, (ii) the term (concept)
decision is amenable to process product ambiguity, (iii) “decision” is a term for
which it is justified to look for a disambiguation, and (iv) disambiguation of
“decision” in favor of an an action rather than the result of that action is most
promising.
A similar disambiguation has been proposed for the notion of “outsourc-
ing” in [15] and [16]. It should be stressed that there is no way that semantic
ambiguities can be removed from one’s language, not even from a formalized
language tailor made to a specific topic. However, in some cases disambiguation
of a notion that had become ambiguous may constitute a step forward.
Evidently each proposal for disambiguation of a term (concept) will meet
intellectual challenges related with its consistency, and besides those challenges
concerning acceptance. Indeed if no-one agrees with the proposed resolution
2A similar dichotomy underlies the survey [47]. That paper distinguishes descriptive and
normative realms of (business) ethical decision making.
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of an ambiguity the pragmatic value of the proposal is very limited. Various
trade-offs will determine whether or not a specific proposal for the resolution of
an instance of process product ambiguity is viable.
For this paper, as well as for my project on decision taking based on this pa-
per, it is only the academic challenge of developing a coherent framework (called
OODT for outcome oriented decision taking) and of assessing its advantages and
disadvantages in principle that matters.
Except for attempts to apply the framework of OODT in my own practices,
no form of social engineering aiming at acceptance of the particular framework
proposed below is among my objectives or ambitions.
1.2 Getting started on decisions and decision making
Writing a paper from first principles on decisions and decision making is a
problematic objective given the amazing size and scope of the existing literature
on these themes. In [6] I have commented at length on this kind of difficulty, in
the context of writing on money. Similar comments may be brought forward in
the present context, and instead of repeating that part of [6] I will only mention
its existence. According to a conclusion drawn in [6] a best effort to write about
a subject is legitimate even if guarantees of novelty cannot be provided due to
the sheer size of the prior art. In addition guidelines on how to work properly
in such circumstances are proposed.3
In spite of the existence of a very extensive literature on decisions and de-
cision making I will not start this paper with giving a survey on decisions and
decision making for the simple reason that doing so adequately is a formidable
challenge in itself and because it seems not to be a prerequisite for this paper.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Section 2 a number of issues are raised each related to decision. In Section 3,
preliminary design decisions are developed concerning a definition of decision.
Section 4.1 contains my proposal for a constructing definition of decision. Sub-
sequently and on the basis of that definition a number of derived concepts is
3Achieving compliance with these demanding guidelines is not an easy matter, however,
an experience I made when writing on the concept of money in [6], and again when writing
on a specific non-classical logic in [8]. In [7] I made an attempt to explain why it is plausible
to test control code, a position which I could not find anywhere in the massive literature on
software testing which invariably takes the rationale of testing for granted. Confronted with
the difficulty to grasp a massive literature on software testing, I made use of what I termed
an informal logic. But I failed to notice that the notion of an informal logic is quite well-
established already and that it has an entire journal devoted to it, something which clearly
should have been made mention of in the same paper. References to papers on informal logic
were subsequently provided in [8]. However, the guidelines from [6] just mentioned imply
that a new version of [7] should have been produced, taking these references (say [50, 64, 65])
adequately into account. Doing so, however, would violate the document uploading rules of
the repository www.arXiv.org which imply that only major modifications of a paper justify
posting new versions. That leaves one with the question when inserting a previously missed
reference is a substantial change of a paper, a question which seems not to have a uniform
answer.
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developed and various ramifications of the definition are considered. In Section
6 initial steps towards the development of a theory of decision taking are made.
Decision taking theory includes decision quality, decision free management, im-
plementation of decision mechanisms, decision making models, levels of decision
making and taking, and decision taking in a structured hierarchy. Following the
conceptual structure of competences and abilities of [15] a survey is given of
conjectural abilities on decision taking which I believe to result from taking
the constructing definition and other aspects of decision taking theory into ac-
count. Finally I return to the title of the paper by listing various informatics
perspectives on decision taking.
2 Preparatory analysis of decision
Many aspects concerning the common intuition of a decision need to be contem-
plated before writing a constructing definition can take off. The constructing
definition to be developed will take some aspects into account. In this Section
I will consider the notion of a decision from different angles thus closing in on
a preliminary survey of issues that may need to be covered by a definition of
decision.
2.1 Primitive and non-primitive concepts
Constructing definitions, by definition of that very notion, do not produce prim-
itive concepts, that is concepts requiring no further constructing definition. But
every constructing definition will ultimately rely on the use of primitive concepts
if its author is committed to avoiding an infinite regress. These matters will first
be considered in some detail.
2.1.1 Decision: not a primitive concept
Attempts of giving an extensive, detailed, or even informative definition of the
concept of a decision are useless if decision is in fact a primitive concept that
cannot be reduced in a useful way to other more primitive concepts.
“For instance “meaning” might be considered a primitive concept, if one
appreciates that defining the meaning of meaning without somehow making use
of that very notion is difficult. Similarly the word important is not easily defined
without already knowing what it means. I hold that the term choice is primitive
in the same sense.
If one assumes that a decision is a choice that matters for the future of the
agent making the choice, then decision is what takes place if an agent (decider)
makes a choice. If the agent is human, and if one believes in the existence of
a free will, one may insist that the agent’s decision is a manifestation (or an
expression) of the agent’s free will.
I will assume a much larger distance between decision and choice, however,
leaving choice a primitive concept which may be explained in terms of math-
ematical theories of an axiomatic nature, such as modal logic, process algebra
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(see [3]), whereas decision is a constructed notion that admits a reduction to
(decomposition in terms of) a collection of primitive elements. In specific cases,
the occurrence of choice may be among these elements.
2.1.2 Decision: not an almost primitive concept
Suppose that decision is identified with choice in the sense that each decision
is a choice but not necessarily the other way around. In that case decision is
not primitive because it can be reduced to another primitive concept. But the
reduction is trivial, as it is a mere renaming which takes into account some
additional requirements. Let a concept be considered almost primitive if its
reduction to a primitive concept is a mere renaming which may express that
some additional requirements have been taken into account. Thus “occasion”
(with the intended meaning of a used car that is for sale) is an example of an
almost primitive concept, assuming that car is a primitive concept. Now the
following question arises: is decision an almost primitive concept. I propose
that this question has a negative answer.
2.1.3 Decision outcome: an almost primitive concept
The existence of a decision requires more than the presence of the outcome
of some process that must have involved a choice. Concerning the outcome a
precise terminology will be needed. In [51] (proposition 4) one finds that “a
considerable gap usually exists between the formulated decision and its imple-
mentation”. This corresponds with the terminology proposed below as follows:
decision outcome will be used instead of formulated decision, and effect is used
instead of implementation. A decision outcome is a result, and the term result
will not be specified any further. As a consequence “decision outcome” is taken
to constitute an almost primitive concept.
2.2 Decision versus decisive action
Some actions seem to require preparatory decisions and some decisions seem to
be of decisive influence. Neither is by necessity the case, however. This leads to
the following observations.
2.2.1 Decisions cannot be postulated in hindsight
In [43] one finds decision as an indication of an activity for which it is unlikely
that it can be performed without a decision having been taken in advance in
such a way that putting its outcome into effect involves or implies just that
activity. For instance a decision to state one’s critical viewpoint in a public
meeting may be assumed to have been taken in advance of an event (public
expression) of that form. However, taking for granted that the existence of such
a decision can be postulated is unwarranted.
This use of the term decision as referring to a postulated decision will be
avoided below because it may lead to confusion and ambiguity. Can one talk
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about the early retirement decision, or the coffee making decision, or the emer-
gency evacuation decision. In the latter case one might be tempted to state
under certain conditions that the emergency evacuation decision has not been
properly taken to express the fact that there was no such decision although
there should have been one.
The term emergency evacuation decision (that is the postulated decision
assumed by an external observer of an emergency evacuation to have taken
place in advance and by which the evacuation was caused) is as problematic as
the well-known top of a stack: what if the stack is empty. Then talking about
its top postulates the existence of an object which fails to exist.
2.2.2 Decision taking need not be decisive action
In [51] USA presidential decision is put forward as being part of a political
process without decisive influence by itself. I will follow this view and assume
that a decision need not be a decisive action, where a decisive action is charac-
terized by being of major explanatory value in hindsight for the occurrence or
non-occurrence of a family of subsequent events.
One may wonder to what extent decisive action must be the consequence
of decision taking. Or stated differently to what extent decision taking is a
prerequisite for decisive action. This question has become very prominent in
political science, because of the fact that several very serious human rights
violations in the 20th century, each of which which can be considered to comprise
decisive action, seem not to have been preceded by a well-organized decision
making process. Thus decisive action need not have been caused or preceded
by a decision in spite of the fact that common use of language suggests the
existence of a corresponding postulated decision. Indeed, the very notion of a
postulated decision has been discarded already. Decisiveness cannot be assessed
in real time (that is during or immediately after an decision has occurred) as it is
a labeling in hindsight only. In contrast decisionness (or degree of decisionality
see 4.3) can be assessed in real time, at least in principle.
In other words decision taking need not be the taking of decisive action, but
it may be. For an action to be decisive it needs to have significant impact. One
may intend an action to be decisive, or expect it to be, but only actions from
the past can be qualified with a significant degree of certainty, as having been
decisive.
2.3 Deciding is decision taking
Decision taking constitutes the culmination of a decision making process. The
so-called decision process is more comprehensive than the decision making pro-
cess and it covers all of the decision making process, and in addition to that
the activities needed, or deemed necessary and for that reason applied, to facil-
itate or to bring about the decision making process. Decision making includes
decision taking and in addition it comprises only but precisely that part of a
decision process which directly influences decision outcomes.
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Decision process making, refers to the activity of one or more agents who
are the driving forces behind a decision process. Decision process making can
be either internal or external. In the latter case I will speak of external decision
process management, which includes external decision process making consul-
tancy. A decision process making agent manages or organizes a decision process.
A decision process may contain actions many of which are connected with the
communication between agents who are directly or indirectly involved in the
decision. A decision process may often be viewed as the putting into effect of a
specific protocol, meant for a particular kind of decision. This putting into effect
may be a multi-threaded concurrent activity driven by several agents, among
which the decision takers, various decision makers, and some decision process
makers as well as assistants for each of these.
The picture I will suggest is that systematic (perhaps professional) decision
taking is embedded in equally systematic decision making. Decision making
requires control both in terms of putting protocols into effect and in terms of
protocol design. Meta-decision taking may be coined for taking decisions that
occur within these tasks. Perhaps a better phrase is: decision process planning
and running. This functionality is responsible for the concurrent effectuation of
decision threads, as well as for adequate thread creation.
2.3.1 Alternatives to taking a decision
Deciding is always an action that exists in a context where agents have other
options. Besides taking a different decision about the same issue, or taking an
alternative decision about an alternative issue, at least the following options for
conducting an alternative action can be distinguished:
administration Taking decisions that control the work of many other agents in a large
variety of circumstances. Administration is the part of an organization
or institution most focused on deciding. Administration includes policy
making about decision process design and control.
networking Connecting to other agents with shared interests.
managing Telling agents and groups of agents what to do, coordinating, planning,
supporting, and monitoring their action.
organizing Designing patterns of activity, and managing agents to act in these pat-
terns.
political action Influencing individuals and groups towards certain ends. Political action
has the flexibility of being less procedural than decision making.4
operation The lowest level of action where the work takes place. Operations rarely
(and preferably not) interrupted by decision taking.
4A political decision is a decision that takes place as a part of a political process, just as
a business decision takes place in a business process.
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2.3.2 Surveying agent roles in connection with a decision
Seen from the viewpoint of a decision a participant in decision taking may
operate in different roles. Here are some options:
take An agent may be taking a decision, individually or as a member of a group
with other agents.
influence An agent may (try to) influence the outcome of a decision.
await An agent may await a decision on which it fails to have any influence.
trigger An agent may cause a decision to be taken without having an influence
on its outcome.
request An agent may ask for some decision to be taken.
2.3.3 Temporal aspects of decision
When speaking of decisions one may speak about future decisions about current
decisions and about past one’s. The fundamental flexibility of the concept of a
decision is that it can be turned into abstract versions by leaving out informa-
tion. With that in mind and allowing flexibility in timing, that is abstraction
from time, the following statements and questions may be meaningful.
who Who took (or will take) that (referring to substantial but incomplete in-
formation) decision.
why Why must that decision (that is a decision matching those specifications)
be taken.
when When has that decision been taken, or when will that decision be taken.
cause Who (if anyone) took the decision to make that decision.
A decision ends a phase of indecision. A decision completes a phase where an
audience of agents awaits the decision. A spontaneous and unexpected action
by an agent is not considered a decision.
2.3.4 Can decision be freely defined?
When contemplating the various possible definitions of decision, I will entertain
the hypothesis, if not the phantasy, that while decision can be assigned a mean-
ing with some degree of freedom, many other related terms like action, event,
process, thread, result, etc. have been provided with a known meaning which
is not going to be changed in the course of a conceptual clarification effort on
decisions. Indeed, dissatisfaction about an account of decision may in principle
be resolved by changing the meaning of many surrounding terms, but going
ahead in that way is not the idea of giving a constructing definition of a notion.
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The constructing definition of decision is developed on the basis of some
preliminary understanding of decision, which is assumed to be available in ad-
vance. By taking notice of Sections 2 and 3 of this paper a reader may acquire
so-called framework competence (see [15] for that notion) concerning the con-
cept of decision which places him properly in the intended audience of the paper.
In informatics the systematic definition of a concept labeled with seemingly fa-
miliar terms is often carried out under the heading of formalization, the use of
that term being justified by the formal and mathematical appearance of texts.
Besides formalization, however, the more important aspect of such definitions
is to accompany an existing intuition of a concept with a much sharper, if not
better, picture of that same concept. In giving the sharper definition a move
may be made from a better picture of the (same) concept to an improved and
modified view of the (adapted) concept, which is meant to replace the previous
view.
As a mode of working this may be considered quite arbitrary indeed, but I
see no alternative path.
2.4 Decision: like collision and unlike inscription
An overwhelming majority of papers on decision making has been written by
authors who apparently assume that the meaning of the phrase “decision mak-
ing” can be taken for granted and for that reason requires no explicit attention,
at least not in their own paper.5 In this common understanding managers, con-
sumers, politicians, and doctors, each make decisions, a task for which they may
appreciate evidence based support, and moreover a task that admits detailed
investigation.
I will assume that a decision is an act or event of deciding. Comparable
cases are: an action is an act or event of acting, an explosion is an act or event
of exploding, a collision is an act or event of colliding, a transmission is an act
or event of transmitting, a computation is an act or event of computing, an
execution is an act or event of executing. Participation is an act or event of
participating.
In contrast to these examples, however, a permission is the outcome of an
act or event of permitting, an edition is the outcome of an act or event of
editing, a construction is the outcome of an act or event of constructing, a
translation is the outcome of an act or event of translating, a transcription is
the outcome of an act or event of transcribing, an inscription is the outcome of
an act or event of inscribing, a definition is the outcome of an act or event of
defining, and an emission often is the outcome of an act or event of emitting.
5An example is [45] and also [36]. Another example is [40], and also the quite philosophical
[30]. The style of writing of [40] is quite common: decision making occurs in situations,
which may be considered opportunities for the decider. Such opportunities may be recognized
and identified, and rather than thinking in terms of the generation of alternatives decision
taking or making agents must focus on the generation and survey of values which determine
what objectives are to be reached. In [40] DM stands out as a well-known and ubiquitous
phenomenon admitting a flexible range of descriptions and analyses, without the risk that
these make no sense because of a commitment to a narrow and specific definition of DM.
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A (problem) solution is the outcome of an act or event of problem solving.
Although a simplification is often the outcome of an act or event of simplifying,
a complication is usually not an act or event of complicating nor the outcome of
such an act or event. Rather complication abbreviates the phrase “complicating
factor”. With pollution the situation is slightly more complex. Usually pollution
is the outcome of a plurality of acts or events of polluting, but in some cases it
refers to the consequences of a single event.
The terms prosecution, prevention, intuition, function, and prohibition do
not fit either of the above schemes. Rather these terms stand for general struc-
tures or roles causing or enacting their instances. This kind of meaning is
implausible for the term decision.
I propose that decision represents an act or event of deciding, rather than the
outcome of such an act or event.6 Having made this “decision” concerning the
meaning of “decision” in relation to “deciding”, the phrase “decision outcome”
is can be used to refer to the outcome of a decision.7 The decision outcome is an
object, perhaps a virtual one, which can last in time, whereas the decision itself
is bound to an agent, an instant of time and a place and immediately becomes
a part of history, often having its decision outcome as its most enduring historic
account.8
Viewing a decision as an act or event of deciding, rather than as the outcome
of such an act or event, cannot be maintained in every context. For instance a
design decision is the outcome of an act or event of deciding about a design. A
personal decision will usually refer to the outcome of an an act of deciding by
a single individual. Decision taking, provided it is distinguished from decision
making in some particular case, constitutes a final and somehow highlighted
stage of decision making, including the last act from which the decision outcome
results.
2.4.1 Preliminary deliberation not required
In many descriptions of decision making (for instance [55]) it seems to be taken
for granted of a decision that it concludes a phase of deliberation during which
several different options (candidate decision outcomes) are compared and that
the decision cumulates in making a choice between these options, the decision
outcome being identical to the chosen decision outcome option. I see no need
for this assumption, and I consider the existence of a deliberation phase to be
optional. Of course it will be often the case that a decision involves making a
6If one holds that decision features so-called state/action ambiguity then I propose to
resolve that ambiguity in favor of action.
7The phrase decision outcome can be found in [35]. In [37] the decision outcome is referred
to as the formal decision. I will not comply with that convention. In [24] a decision process,
or equivalently, a decision-making process is said to end in the final making of a choice, or in
the ultimate decision of choice.
8Clearly an alternative is to have decision stand for what I proposed to be named a decision
outcome. Then a phrase is needed for the act of taking a decision. No obvious candidate seems
to be on offer, however. I will equate “a decision has been taken” with “a decision has taken
place”. I will also equate decision taking with deciding.
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choice between several options, and that the decision process involves some form
of deliberation admitting a comparison of those options, but it is consistent to
assume that the only alternative that has been considered in the process leading
up to a particular decision concerning some subject was not to produce any
decision (concerning that same subject matter, that is with the same or similar
objectives) at all at the time of deciding.
Taking the meta-decisionmd to make a decision, say d concerning a subject s,
with d not yet fully specified but with d’s outcome in outcome typeD, or with an
outcome constrained by requirements R, is itself part of the very decision process
of d. In order to state this matter properly one must be capable of speaking
about a future decision as an action that complies with some specifications and
which will be refined from these specifications during the decision process that
leads up to that decision.
2.4.2 Decision ends a phase of indecision
I propose that each decision is preceded by a phase, however short in time, of
indecision. That is some awareness of the need or opportunity that a certain
decision is about to be taken must be present at least within the deciding agent.
Thus a decision ends an episode of indecision. The phase of indecision may be
merely a postulated phenomenon, however, because its existence need not be
provable in hindsight from documents or other records.
2.5 Atomicity and scope
The slogan that a decision is an act9 or event of deciding cannot serve as a
definition of a decision unless deciding has been defined. It only serves as a
requirement on how to use words and phrases. A decision need not be atomic,
it may split in several subsequent acts or events.10 More specifically, a decision
is a progression (see [22]) of acts or events that together qualify as representing
an agent’s activity of deciding.11
The decision taking process is a part of the decision making process, which
may be imagined as the run of a decision making pipeline. A structured decision
9I will use act as a shorthand for activity.
10In [34] (p. 4) one finds: “..It is often hard to pinpoint the exact stage at which a decision
is reached. more often than not, the decision comes about naturally during discussions, when
the concensus seems to be reached among those whose judgement and opinion the executive
seeks.” In [62], however, a unique decision moment is said to exist. After that moment the
decision cannot be taken again.
11This view is consistent with [56] although that paper seems to identify the decision process
with the decision making process, and [56] proposes that a decision is a progression of the
entire decision process. In contrast I will assume only that a decision is a progression of the
decision taking process. A decision making progression is more comprehensive and it may
involve steps not included in decision taking, such as the taking of a preliminary decision and
the commenting and subsequent reworking and resubmission to the decision making pipeline
of an improved preliminary decision outcome. A clear example of a decision making pipeline
is presented in [32].
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making process contains those steps of the workflow leading up to a decision
which are explanatory for the final decision outcome.
Yet more comprehensive is the decision process. If a decision making process
involves a meeting for taking a preliminary decision, the production of the inputs
to that meeting will be part of the decision making process, while reserving
the room and corresponding catering is part of the decision process but is not
included in the decision making process. The decision process includes the
actions and events of the decision making process together with all supporting
and enabling activity, including catering, AV preparation, printing and copying,
process control and monitoring, security, and transportation.
Decision process making (equivalently decision progression making) is the
making of a progression of acts or events of a decision process, without partic-
ipation in the decision making proper. Speaking in terms of progressions (or
runs) I thus distinguish: decision taking progression (equals decision), decision
making progression, and decision process progression.
Thus decision making ends with a decision (a decision taking progression)
which produces a decision outcome. Decision taking is performed by the agent
who is deciding. Decision making (equivalently: a decision making progression)
includes decision taking at its tail but comprises more preparatory steps if any
are present. One may feel the need to speak of a decision making process making
to denote the task of the agent who sees to it that decision making takes place,
that is that a decision making progression is being produced. Instead of decision
making process making I will simply speak of decision process making. Indeed in
order to ensure that a decision making progression takes place many additional
and supporting acts may be required which will beu subsumed under decision
making because of the absence of impact on the decision outcome.
Decision process making may be compared with theater making, which is
the making of a progression of acts or events of theater play (playing). Theater
making is often performed by someone not actually playing him- or herself.
This suggests that an external (second) agent might be involved in order to
bring a decision about for some agent, comparable the role of a theater maker.
One may think in terms of decision planning and control, with planner and
controller different from the deciding agent. If the agent is a single individual
this thought experiment coincides with the issue raised in [61]. A plausible term
for that role is a decision consultant. The decision consultant, if present at all,
sees to it that a decision occurs, or equivalently that decision taking takes place.
Decision consulting and deciding operate simultaneously and interactively. The
decision consultant is not involved in decision taking, because the consultant
sees to it that another agent will take a decision. But as the consultant may be
quite influential its actions may be included in the process of decision making.
2.6 An intrinsic circularity concerning decisions
If one intends to define the notion of an inhabitant of a country, one finds that
for understanding a country as a social structure, one needs the notion of an
inhabitant already. The notions of country and inhabitant must be defined
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simultaneously. A similar issue pops up when contemplating a definition of
decision, or more specifically a decision taken by an agent (or a collective of
agents) A. I will now argue that the concept of decision involves a circularity
which I don’t see how to remove. In fact in the definition of decision in Section
4.1 I will ignore this circularity, thus leaving open the question how to find
an improved definition that takes it into account in a more serious way. The
circularity comes from the fact that it is implausible to assign an agent the
role of a decider without understanding what a decision is to begin with. Some
agents simply cannot play that role. But in the definition in Section 4.1 I will
not impose any constraints on the agent acting as a decider in an event to be
considered a decision.
Indeed for A to be deciding it must be possible that A takes any decisions at
all. The power to take decisions is constitutive for the concept of an agent for
which it makes sense to assert that it takes any particular decision. A decision
outcome x of a decision d taken by agent/unit A can be a plan, in which case it
must be assumed that A has the power to see to it that the plan will be put into
effect.12 In other words a decision d can only be taken by an agent A if it has the
power to take decisions from a class of (potential) decisions, say CA containing
d. After the outcome o(d) has been put into effect, A’s power to take decisions
has potentially been changed, that is CA may now differ (having become say
C′A) as a side effect of the implementation of the decisions outcomes. An obvious
example of that state of affairs is found with an agent A who is deciding to buy
some expensive real estate, and who, as a consequence of putting that decision
into effect, is losing almost all of its cash and who is from that moment onwards
in debt. A′s power to take decisions that will cost money (or rather, the putting
into effect of the outcome of which will decrease the amount of money in A’s
disposal) has been significantly decreased.
3 Problem statement and solution outline
The problem to be analyzed and from some perspective solved in this paper
is: what is a decision? In order to assess the usefulness of an answer to this
question, that is a candidate definition of the concept of a decision, I will list
some questions about the notion of a decision the answering of which would
have to be supported by a candidate definition under scrutiny. In particular the
answer given should be helpful to assess the following questions about decision
12According to [48] power can be understood as a medium comparable to money capable of
ensuring that outcomes are put into effect. Power then constitutes a background mechanism
within which an agent may be capable of taking some decisions and incapable of taking other
decisions. Defining the power of an agent in terms of the decisions it may both take and be
sure to see their outcomes being put into effect seems to be consistent with the analysis of
[48].
A’s power to make decisions can at each moment be defined as the collection of decision
outcomes that (i) it may plausibly put into effect, and that (ii) are decision outcomes of
decisions that it may take when operating according to the rules that have been set for the
various types of decisions.
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processes in specific cases, in particular in a context of organizational decision
processes.
3.1 Some questions and answers on decisions
The answers provided for the following questions will support and hopefully
explain the choices (design decisions) made in the definition of decision that
will be given in detail in Section 4.1.
• Given a specific theme or area, for relevance for some organization. What
terminology is to be used about decision making concerning that theme?
I will distinguish: decision process, decision, making, decision taking, and
decision shaking. Given those notions: which agents are involved in the
decision process, in decision making, in decision taking, and in decision
shaking.
Decision shaking is a political process performed by agents or groups of
agents outside the hierarchical control of the decision taking agent, after
and as a consequence of the decision having been taken. It leads to its
destruction in hindsight as an authoritative statement. It renders the
decision outcome futile. It may also have negative impact on the position
of those who took the decision and even on those who were involved in
the decision making process leading to the (shaken) decision.
• Suppose that an agent has concluded that he will probably be involved in
decision making, or in decision taking concerning a topic: which activities
are involved in that role?
An answer to this question depends on circumstances which may vary
from organization to organization and from theme to theme. Given an
organization and a coherent (that is interrelated) bundle of themes of
comparable importance for the organization, it is reasonable to assume
that decisions can be classified into a number of categories, such that for
each class taking a decision within that class requires that some protocol of
preparatory actions (which may include some decisions) must be followed.
Such a protocol is informative about the interface that an agent may
provide and make use of.
• How to refer to those activities involved in a decision process that are not
part of decision making? Where are the boundaries with decision making
and how to assess the relevance of these actions for the decision process?
To answer these questions an interface of basic actions (see [22]) must
be determined which indicates the activities that can be performed by
the chief decision taker. Some of these actions comprise the issuing of
impositions to other agents who act in supporting roles.
• How to name key roles in the decision process? Here I will assume that
human agents are at stake. If a group is taking a decision each of the
members is said to be taking a decision.
16
I will speak of a decision taking officer (DTO), given an organization and a
bundle of themes of relevance for that organization, if an agent is regularly
involved in decision taking about one or more of the themes in the bundle.
A chief decision taking officer (CDTO) is always involved in the decision
taking processes of highest importance. Both DTO en CDTO are supposed
to have decision taking as their main activity within the organization.
If a person is taking decisions only occasionally he is classified as DTP for
decision taking personnel. Every (C)DTO is also DTP. Decisions taken
by DTP in that capacity are either final decisions, that is decisions con-
stituting the termination of a decision process, or preparatory decisions
that are part of the protocol leading to a final decision.
Besides DTP there is DMP, decision making personnel. Non-DTP DMP
is at least occasionally involved in preparatory steps for decision making.
DMP personnel not classified as DTP need not be taking orders only. They
may act at their own initiative to contribute to various phases of decision
making, for instance by analyzing the expected effect of a proposed deci-
sion outcome, or by analyzing the risks posed by unintended side-effects
of a decision (that is of putting into effect the decision outcome if the
decision were taken), or by unintended consequences of a proposed deci-
sion outcome (equally hypothetical of course). Yet more comprehensive
is DPP, decision process personnel. Non-DMP DPP has a supportive role
only and will not take any influence on decision outcomes.
• How can a dedicated decision taking agent be characterized in mechanical
terms? In other words: what kind of procedures are put into practice
by an agent with a primary focus on decision taking (at some level of
abstraction and in the context of some organization)?
The perspective of a (C)DTO is as follows: different decision processes
take place as threads in a multi-threaded system. The (C)DTO is respon-
sible for scheduling the multi-thread of decision processes by means of an
appropriate form of strategic interleaving ([17]). In doing so the (C)DTO
instructs other agents to take part in the decision process at large and in
decision making fragments of it.
• What drives a decision process?
A decision process is a thread consisting of the putting into effect (see
[10]) of a single pass instruction sequence P (see the program algebra
outlined in [14]). A (C)DTO is putting initial segments of P into effect
while regularly extending it as an outcome of a planning process. The
mechanics of the planning process and subsequent thread extension are
left unspecified in the formalization of thread algebra (see [18, 17]).
3.2 Meta-decisions on the definition of decision
The proposed answer on the question what constitutes a decision as embodied
in the definition in Section 4.1 below involves some meta decisions (alternatively
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called design decisions) with which one may disagree. Without taking the risk
of such disagreement writing this paper is pointless. Here are the main meta
decisions that enter my explanation of what is a decision:
• A decision is an action occurring in space and time, and it is performed
by an agent who is responsible for the decision.
• A decision has an outcome, which is a representation of the content of the
decision in a form which can endure in time. For instance a digital text
posted on a website controlled by the responsible agent.
• The outcome must be distinguished from the effect of a decision, which is
best seen as the consequences of putting the outcome into efect.13 There
may not be any effect if no agent bothers to put into effect the decision
outcome. Producing the effect of a decision outcome by putting it into
effect it is not part of the decision process of that decision. The decision
process leads up to the generation and making available of the decision
outcome and ends thereafter.
• Decision taking differs from making a choice or expressing a preference,
and decision making also differs from the determination of a preference.14
Such tasks are often input to a decision but do not constitute the decision
itself. As a consequence of this meta decision a major part of the literature
on decision making has to be reclassified as being about making a choice
or optimizing a possible selection from a menu of options. Thus: choosing
is not deciding about a choice. Choosing is more primitive than deciding
and less context sensitive. Deciding, however, may be based on a choice.
If a choice lies on the path (pipeline, workflow) which creates a candidate
decision outcome in preparation of a decision d to be taken, that choice
constitutes part of the decision making process (and hence of the decision
process) for the decision d but not of the decision taking process.
• Decisions are always taken in a context where some awareness of expected
effects (of the decision outcome, that is of putting the decision outcome
into effect) is present. Decisions are taken in order to bring expected
effects of their outcome about.
13In [66] one finds the convention that decision outcome stands for what I propose to call the
effect of the decision outcome. If it has been decided to buy some gadget, the actual purchase
is caused by that decision, and it may be considered the effect of the decision outcome.
14Nutt [46] considers choice a possible unit of analysis occurring as one of many actions to be
considered when having a decision focus. He distinguishes between the unit of analysis and the
level of analysis. Nutt also mentions the nesting of decisions as an aspect of scope regarding
decision making research. In [31] decision and choice are identified, though not explicitly. In
[53] and [42] decision and choice are treated without distinction. In [28] a decision is essentially
a choice but compiling the menu of options as well as developing predictions of the effects of
various decision outcomes (that is options under the assumption that these have been chosen)
is considered part of the decision as well. In [63] ethical decision making is understood as
action selection under ethical constraints.
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• A decision d may itself be caused by one or more preparatory decisions
which play a predefined role in a decision process. Taking the preparatory
decisions is part of the decision making that culminates in the decision d
being taken. Activities needed for the decisions involved in the decision
making for d are part of its decision process.
• Even if a decision d produces an outcome with the subsequent and intended
effect e, that effect may not have decision d as its most prominent cause.
For instance it may be the case that some preparatory decision dp has
given rise to a state from where unavoidably d was going to be taken, in
which case the preparatory decisiondp is an original cause of the effect e
(of putting the outcome of d into effect) rather than the decision d itself.
Nevertheless the agent a who took decision d may subsequently be held
responsible for the effect e (of implementing the decision outcome of d)
even in the case that the “real cause” dp has been a decision taken by
another agent, say b. Perhaps b is held morally responsible for e in such a
case.
• The term decidability as used in the theory of computation refers to the
possibility to make some choice effectively, that is uniformly computed by
means of an idealized computer. In the absence of any intended effects of
that choice, an instantiation of decidability as an act of effectively making
a choice between several options must not be considered a decision, but
merely a choice. A consequence of this meta decision about the meaning of
“undecidability” is that the so-called undecidability of the halting problem
(see [20]) is not about the absence of the possibility to make some decision
but about the absence of a method for effectively making a choice. So
I would prefer the phrasing that the halting problem is not effectively
solvable.
3.3 Alternative approaches for defining decision
An obvious difficulty with the above requirements stated about the notion of
a decision is that whatever definition one comes up with, it will not fit in a
few lines, thus defeating the extreme conciseness which characterizes concept
definitions favored in the circles of management science.
Trying to provide a shorter definition of a decision, which conveys some but
perhaps not all of the content considered essential for a decision brought about
these “shorthand definitions”:
1. A decision is the promotion by an agent of some data representing a pro-
posed decision outcome to the elevated status of a decision outcome.
2. An example of a decision is the act of giving (or refusing) permission to
another agent to perform some activity, given a request by the other agent
for that permission. The decision outcome is the statement (including
motivation) of that permission (or refusal) in a durable form.
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Another example of a decision is to turn a preliminary decision into a fi-
nal one after accommodating comments by various parties on the decision
outcome of the preliminary decision. The decision outcome may for in-
stance be the written intention to release funds for certain purposes, or the
written intention to organize a specific meeting, or the written intention
to terminate some operation, and so on.
In principle the concept of a decision can be obtained as an inductively
found generalization from a limited number of significant examples.
3. Decision taking (making) is the application (that is a meaningful instan-
tiation) of a competence which one may prove to be in command of by
having participated in a substantial range of decision taking (making) ac-
tivities. Decision taking (making) competence is a community competence
in the sense of [15].
Two forms of openness can be distinguished: open expectation, open in-
tention. I am inclined to rank open decisions of either or both kinds higher
than closed ones. In addition an open intention decision can be deceptive
which diminishes its quality.15
4 Definition of decision
4.1 Decision defined by way of construction and filtering
The definition below comprises two parts. First a constructive definition intro-
duces entities that might count as definitions. Having defined the kind of event
which constitutes a decision, the next step is to list constraints phrased in a
negative form, filtering out events that on closer inspection are not considered
decisions.16
4.1.1 Constructive part of the definition
A decision is an event (below referred to as The Event) which is specified in
detail as a tuple containing the following items.
time and place Coordinates in space and time for The Event (with spatial coordinates
being less important if the agent is an aggregate operating in a distributed
fashion). The temporal information may provide a time interval rather
than a single moment in time, because The Event need not be atomic in
time.
15Of course there are circumstances where the deception coming along with a decision is its
key quality, but I will consider those circumstances exceptional and I will not insist that the
mentioned quality criteria will apply as well in such exceptional cases.
16This definition of a decision outcome may be considered an extension (enrichment) of the
definition of a promise.It follows that the core of a decision is a promise as defined in [12],
where a promise is taken to be a documented intention with an explicit scope of announcement.
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timing The timing mechanism indicates how, or under which constraints, time
(and place) of The Event are found. Concerning the timing mechanism
several scenarios may exist such as for instance:
real time. The Event must take place at some specific moment in time.
Its type and requirements are known in advance. Clearly human
decision taking has an inherent imprecision in timing which cannot be
overcome. Faster decision taking must be automated, which implies
that some machine or software agent is considered to play the role of
a decision maker.
fixed deadline. A decision (of some type, and satisfying some require-
ments of its outcome) must be taken before some known deadline.
opportunity interval. The decision may need to be taken within a given
time interval, that is a temporal window of opportunity.
open end. There is no firm deadline for a decision but its type and more
specific requirements are known.
go, no go. Like an open deadline decision but now the outcome require-
ments are fully specified. It may be that after some moment in time
the outcome is vacuous, that is, the implementation of the decision
outcome is an empty process if some moment in time has been passed.
decider The decider is an agent, including the option of an aggregate agent (that
is a group of agents), in the role of a decision taker.
agent role A role in which the decider operates with regard to The Event. This
attribute is essential if the agent is acting in different roles simultaneously
at the specified time and place. An agent role can only be determined with
some reference model of a social structure or an organizational framework
in mind. This attribute must provide a true role, and not merely a name
for it. From a role the power of an agent can be derived, at least in
principle.
input data A package of data playing the role of decision inputs. These inputs typ-
ically include, a classification of the decision outcome to be produced,
together with protocol information on how that kind of decision is to be
made and taken, a menu of options, preferences imposed on the various
menu items, test reports, artifact reviews and assessments, advice from
external consultants, motivations for preferences, results of optimal choice
analysis between menu items, proposed decision outcomes, historic data
about the coming into existence of these proposals including data about
who has been consulted on the basis of preparatory decision outcomes,
which objections have been taken into account etc.
outcome A text, or more generally a meaningful symbolic or graphical code, in rigid
or in spoken form, stored with some permanency, playing the role of the
so-called decision outcome.
21
A decision outcome is a description of a state of affairs which either is
put into effect by the very decision taken, or can be put into effect by
subsequent action performed by a standing organization of agents or by
self-organizing agents. These agents will invoke their own activity on the
basis of their acknowledgement of the role of the decision taker.
outcome type A type or class to which the decision outcome is supposed to belong. The
type information may also indicate which protocol must have been fol-
lowed in preparation of the event. This is a non-exhaustive set of possible
decision outcomes types:
reply. A Boolean reply concerning a question that has been put in ad-
vance.
assertion. An assertion of a fact, or of the endorsement of a fact. The fact
may either be spelled out in the decision outcome or it may be known
via a reference. Assertions may have further types such as: verdict,
opinion, hypothesis, guess, claim, confirmation, and rejection.
plan. A plan to be put into action once triggered externally is a certain
way.
outcome novelty Given a decision outcome type additional constraints (or rather constraint
types) on the outcome may exist, constraining the novelty of the outcome.
Such constraints constitute part of the decision. Here are some possible
values for this attribute.
closed solution. The decision outcome may be almost entirely known
for some time already, and one waits for the corresponding decision
to take place. (In this case the outcome represents no novelty at all.)
indication. A question together with a menu of alternative answers may
be provided. The requirement is that the decision outcome indicates
a choice of an answer. For each choice some numerical parameters
may need to be instantiated in addition. (In this case the outcome
represents no novelty at all, but the choice that has been made may
be unexpected.)
half open solution. The menu of alternative answers as just mentioned
may be merely an indication and other potential solutions may well
exist. Then the decision will produce an outcome that may comprise
the result of some creative activity. (This case implies limited novelty
only.)
open solution. A problem area may be given together with the assertion
that the decision (or rather the consequences of implementing its
outcome) must contribute to its solution, though no indication of
possible outcomes satisfying that requirement are given. (Novelty is
possible.)
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protocol The protocol indicates how the decision process leading to The Event
must be shaped. At least the protocol indicates the start of the phase of
indecision which has been brought to completion by The Event.
scopes There are several scopes involved in a decision:
endorsement scope. The endorsement scope contains those agents on
behalf of whom The Event is performed. It contains at least the
decider (who has been listed in a previous item). (Members of the
endorsement group are alternatively called co-deciders or co-decision
takers.)
primary announcement scope. Contains those agents to whom the deci-
sion outcome is addressed.
implementation scope. Contains those agents whose behavior will be
guided (by those agents constituting the announcement scope) so as
to put the outcome into effect.
secondary announcement scope. Those agents outside the primary an-
nouncement scope who will be told (or may be told) about the de-
cision. This set may be empty in the case of a secret decision (also
called a hidden decision). It is assumed that the decider sees to it
that the decision outcome is not communicated outside the secondary
announcement scope.
effect scope. Those agents whose existence is supposed to be influenced
by the decision outcome being put into effect.
public expectation An expectation of the effects that announcement of the (decision) outcome
will have. This information is made available within the announcement
scope.
public intention An intention of the agent together with a motivation why the decision
conforms to that intention. In particular it must be guaranteed that the
decision taking agent has some grounds on which to base the expectation
that the effect of announcing the decision outcome complies with the in-
tentions. In an open intention decision the intention is documented and is
communicated as a part of the decision outcome. In that case the decision
may be considered an enrichment of a promise. In a closed intention (or
secretive intention) decision, the intention is not communicated in the way
mentioned above.
An open intention decision may be deceptive if, viewed as a promise it is
a deception (see [12] for that notion in the context of promises).
private expectation An expectation of the effects that announcement of the (decision) outcome
will have. This information is made available only within the endorsement
scope.
private intention A private intention is optional. If it exists it differs from the public inten-
tion.
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risk analysis (Optional) a risk assessment that the decision outcome will fail to lead to
the intended consequences. Risk assessment may split in a private and a
public component.
4.1.2 Filtering out instances of choice
The above constructive view of events that may count as definitions is in fact
too wide. Negatively formulated constraints are used to filter out events which
might comply with the constructive definition but which I propose, nevertheless,
not to count as decision.
Not a choice. A decision outcome must not be a selection made from a pre-
determined menu of options. An action leading to such a selection is a
choice (act of choosing) rather than a decision.17
Not a voting. Voting is a special mechanism for making a choice and for that
reason it will inherit not counting as a decision from its superclass choice.
Not an instance of action determination. Action determination is the act
of determining how to act immediately followed by performing that ac-
tion.18
4.2 Derived notions about decisions
Having a precise definition of decision available a variety of notions can be
developed on top of it. These notions are useful when speaking of decision
processes, decision making progressions, and decision taking progressions.
Implicit decision. An implicit decision (also named a postulated decision) is
not a decision, at least not in general. In other words the decision to φ
need not have existed even if φ is taking place and some observers may
think of a decision to φ as a necessary precondition for doing φ.
However, if an organization functions in such a way that certain activities,
say φ can only be performed when based on a preceding decision to that
end, that decision may be referred to as the decision to φ, and such a
decision may be termed an implicit decision
Primitive decision. A decision d is primitive if it is not a consequence of
putting into effect a previous decision e for which the occurrence of d was
an intended effect (that is such that the occurrence of d features amongst
the intentions that constitute d).
17A choice may constitute an essential part of decision making, because enacting a choice
may be needed in advance of the composition of a candidate decision outcome. It a committee
searches for a person to appoint for a job it will choose who to appoint from a “menu” of
available candidates, and then a higher body will be advised thus, so that it can take an
appropriate decision, an action which does not involves making a choice anymore.
18Car drivers while driving perform action determination rather than decision taking.
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Decision error. Various errors can occur when a decision is taken. For in-
stance the co-deciders may not be sufficiently involved, an agent in the
primary announcement scope may be missed out, agents outside the pri-
mary announcement scope may be informed. Further, the outcome may
be phrased in meaningless language, it may be inconsistent with the public
intention, time and place may not match the timing constraints, the agent
may not play its stated role, the expectation (about the consequences of
putting the outcome into effect) may be unjustified.
Decision management. Decision taking is performed by decision takers and co-
decision takers, but it constitutes an activity which is mediated by other
agents and tasks. Decision management is performed by agents whose
task it is to see to it that useful decisions are made properly. It is possible
but not necessary that decision takers are decision managers as well.
Decision orchestration. Decision orchestration constitutes an aspect of decision
management with a focus on the design of individual decision processes.
Decision orchestration involves questions like: who must take a certain
decision? What protocol must be involved when taking a certain kind of
decision? Who should be involved in decision making, given a decision
taking protocol.
Decision choreography. Decision choreography may also be considered a branch
of decision management. Decision choreography takes place if a variety
of decision processes is to be managed in parallel. Its focus in on the
arrangement of interconnections between different decision processes that
are progressing in parallel.
Decision taking competence. A community competence emerging from having
played a variety of roles in a variety of decision taking processes (see [15]
for a description of community competence).
Decision making competence. A community competence emerging from having
played a variety of roles in a variety of decision making processes.
Decision ratification. In some cases a decision once taken needs some kind
of public confirmation, for instance: crowning a king, handing over a
certificate, publicly announcing an agent’s bankruptcy. Ratification may
be used for this, though in some cases ratification still may fail so that it
is closer to decision taking after all.
The use of the terms orchestration and choreography has been borrowed from
service science where these terms have been used with considerable success with
a clear technical meaning from which the above proposals have been derived
(see [49]).
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4.3 Ramifications arising from the definition
The definition of decision given above gives rise to further questions. These
questions may indicate the need for modifications and refinements of the defi-
nition.
Decisionness. In spite of the lengthy definition just given, it seems to be the
case that an utterance of an agent being a decision is a gradual matter.
There are no definite demarcation lines. Rather than defining when an
event constitutes a decision, one may understand the above definition
as an outline of a description of the concept of “degree of decisionality”
(that is the degree to which the event qualifies as a decision).19 If all
attributes are present the degree is very high (say equal to 1). If only an
outcome exists and all other attributes are absent the degrees takes its
lowest value, say 0. Different groups of stakeholders may disagree in their
decisionality assessment of the same event. The mere statement that an
utterance is referred to as a decision by the agent making the utterance
does not in itself contribute to the degree of decisionality, though many
agents will be happy to label their own utterances as decisions, in spite of
defects concerning one or more of the criteria mentioned in the definition
of decision above.
Definition complexity. The above definition of decision is both lengthy and
complex. Can it be the case that an important notion like decision is in
need of a definition of this complexity? Or is the entire project of defining
decision heading in the wrong direction if it leads to a result that is hard
to memorize in the first place. For the moment I think that a definition
of this complexity may be needed to find firm ground for a theory of
decision taking. More concise definitions can be developed subsequently
for application in a specific context.
Decision templates. When it is said that some decision must be taken, this
means that partial information about a decision is given in advance (called
a decision template), which may or may not include the identity of an
agent, that it is expected of some agent (or in case it is contained in the
decision template, the agent mentioned in the template) that it produces
a decision the the description of which completes the given decision tem-
plate. Many different decision templates are conceivable, and much less
information than required by the above definition may be included in a
template. The concept of a decision seems to have been simplified by the
simplicity of its most common templates. Notwithstanding that, a deci-
19In [10] I have introduced the notion of a degree of executionality in order to deal with the
problem that I could not find any convincing and straightforward definition of the notion of
instruction sequence execution (a progression of machine steps constituting an execution of
an instruction sequence, with instruction sequences defined as in [14]). In [16] the degree of
outsoucingness was coined in order to deal with gradual phenomena that occur if one plans
to define under which circumstances a sourcement transformation qualifies as an outsourcing.
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sion when taken brings together all information as mentioned in the above
definition.
Nested scopes. A decision can be unexpected for agents in its scope. To
understand this it must be assumed that scopes are collections of agents,
and that various scopes, ordered by inclusion come into play when defining
a decision.
For instance, the phenomenon of an episode of indecision will be noticed
by agents in some scope between the endorsement scope (decision taker
scope, or decider scope) and the primary announcement scope. The scope
of decision making agents (decision maker scope) extends the endorsement
scope, but it need not be included in the primary announcement scope.
Label justification. Is every event which is called (labeled) a decision in fact a
decision. This is a matter of justification. And conversely: are all decisions
(that is activities or progressions that comply with the above definition of
decision) indeed marked as decisions. The state of affairs seems to be as
follows. Labeling a progression a decision may be unjustified. But agent
A may still have an interest in doing so. A decision need not be labeled
(called, referred to) as a decision. But some actions may be elevated to
the status of a decision by being referred to in that way.
If in a religious ceremony the minister or priest declares a couple married,
that act qualifies as a decision according to the given definition, although
it will not often be labeled as such. The couple has made a preliminary
decision, the effect of which has been amongst other effects that the digni-
tary has planned the ceremony and has prepared the certificate that serves
as a decision outcome. What makes one reluctant to label the minister’s or
priest’s action as a decision is the lack of choice. The dignitary, however,
might have declined to marry the couple for a variety of reasons.
Causal chains of decision. Given an organization, some activities performed
by individuals or groups of its members require that some preparatory
decision has been taken so that the activity can be understood as a con-
sequence of the decision.
Non-decision actions. Most actions that occur in a business process are not
part of a decision process. This matter has been discussed in Paragraph
2.3.2. Once a focus on decisions is introduced and a decision is said to be
an action (which may or may not be atomic in time and space), the term
action is not by default referring tot a non-decision. Lacking a positive
qualification for an action not being a decision I borrow the phrase target
action from [17] for non-decision process actions. The idea is that decision
making is performed within a system in order to allow it to properly
perform its main task consisting of a multitude of target actions. For
instance the decision to schedule a course leads to the many target actions
involved in delivering the course.
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The notion of a target action is relative to a class of decisions. Seen
from a higher level of abstraction, that is from the standpoint of decision
choreography the decisions occurring in a progression of one of the partic-
ipating decision processes are mere target actions. However, at the level
of a particular decision process resulting from decision orchestration, the
same progression may be viewed as an alternation of decisions, decision
making actions, decision process actions, and target actions. These target
actions may in turn be decomposed in an choreography controlled parallel
composition of orchestrations each of which may constitute an alterna-
tion of target actions (at some lower level), decision making actions and
decisions.
Can animals take decisions? The definition given above leads to the propo-
sition that animals cannot take decisions, mainly because they cannot
produce “results”. Here a result consists of storable and meaningful infor-
mation. Of course most animals can make choices, but that is a different
matter. Still this assertion is a matter worth more attention, it might
be mistaken on biological grounds, or it might be considered unfortunate
to the extent that it constitutes an incentive to rework the definition of
decision.
Once this view is adopted it becomes implausible that a solitary operating
human being without support of some form of technology, including social
and organizational technology, can take decisions.
4.4 Demarcation from neighboring concepts
Ins spite of the detailed definition of a decision given above the concept of a
decision admits a continuous transformation into several neighboring concepts.
Here are some gradual traditions to other notions from a decision which may
occur:
Decision outcome. Under gradually changing circumstances the distinction
between decision and decision outcome may evaporate, with as a conse-
quence that the process product ambiguity of decision reappears.
This gradual transition may for instance occur if the action involved in a
decision becomes less and less pronounced, perhaps undetermined in space
and time, an a situation may arise where the decision outcome still exists
but no act of deciding counts as the origin or cause of existence of the
decision outcome.
Promise issuing. The issuing of a promise may become indiscernible from a
decision in each of the following (continuously changing) conditions: if the
role of the decider becomes less pronounced, if the decider is increasingly
inclined to play a role in the effectuation of the decision outcome, if the
decider is increasingly disinterested other agents packing part in putting
the decision outcome into effect, if the decision outcome implies some form
of obligation on the decider, etc.
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Choosing ands voting. In a family of related conditions for decision taking
the decision outcome may increasingly be considered a choice from a menu.
This vector of change of a decision allows a continuous transformation into
a choice or, if the appropriate mechanics for choosing are in place, a voting.
Adopting a plan. A plan may be consider a promise an agent issues to itself.
Adopting a plan may be considered a form of issuing a promise to oneself.
in just the same way as the demarcation between deciding and promise
issuing is fuzzy (that is, there is no sharp demarcation), the demarcation
between deciding and plan adoption is fuzzy.
5 Terminology for choice and planning
Choice is unlike decision in that no choice outcome is expected preceding the
effectuation of the chosen activity. Choice involves making a choice between
given alternatives for further action. Choice unlike decision involves a low degree
of design.
5.1 Choice
I will propose a terminology for choice that is somewhat remote from conven-
tional usage in order to have a better tuning with the proposed terminology for
decision. A choice is an act of choosing. For a choice to occur (as an action per-
formed by some agent A) at some stage A needs to generate a menu of options
for further action from which the choice is to be made. Generating the menu is
a part of the choice preparation phase of choice making.
Once the menu is available to the agent A a sequences of steps may be
required for A to find out which of the actions from the menu will be chosen. A
choice issuing thread, (or choice taking thread) may have been defined during
the choice preparation phase and effectuation of the choice taking thread by A
will end in some of the actions from the mentioned menu being performed. The
act of performing that action indicates that a choice has been issued.
A formal choice outcome may be considered as being a description of the
choice (the chosen menu item) that has been issued. Choosing, however does
not entail the production of a choice outcome, it merely entails the effectuation
of the choice outcome.
If instead of effectuating the choice outcome, a mere description of the chosen
menu item is produced by A as an outcome a plan has been produced rather
than that a choice has been issued.
Choice determination refers to factors which may allow an external agent to
predict the selection that agent A makes when issuing a choice.
5.2 Plan issuing
Planning is plan making. Once a plan has been prepared and plan making has
come to an end the final stage is the production of a plan outcome (usually
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simply called a plan) and the inclusion of the plan into an agent’s portfolio of
plans.
I hold that after the plan has been issued an agent still needs to issue a
choice between different plans as a precondition for the effectuation of a plan to
begin.
It is plausible that choice making involves an extensive planning phase in
which several plans are issued together constituting a menu from which at some
stage a choice is made. Issuing the choice may entail an announcement to other
agents of the plan that has been selected as a first step of its effectuation.
5.3 Action determination
I will use the term action determination for a process that in real time brings
an agent to finding what to do, in terms of activity, and doing it. The difference
between choice and action determination is that in the latter no choice from a
prefabricated menu is involved. Admittedly there is a somewhat unfortunate
terminological collision between action determination (done by the acting agent)
and choice determination (done by an external observer of the acting agent).
6 Decision taking theory
The extensive definition of decision may prove its value by constituting a pro-
ductive point of departure for developing a theory of decision. The definition
itself must be considered a part of a theory of decision, to some extent it already
qualifies as a theory of decision, irrespective of the merits of that theory.
Decision theory is a classical phrase. In [57] and in [39] it is identified with
the theory of making a choice between a variety of possible actions. It is possible
to leave that meaning unchallenged if one admits or accepts that decision theory
is not about decision taking but about choice making (that is choosing). For
this reason I will speak of decision taking theory if the theory is about decision
taking with decision defined as in Section 4.1. Of course decision taking theory
has many variations parametrized by different definition of decision and decision
taking. Nevertheless I require of decision taking theory that it is based on a
concept of decision which is takes a choice as an input rather than incorporating
the choice as its essence.
6.1 Leadership without decision mechanism: decision free
management
The language of decision making has become so ubiquitous that it seems obvious
that organizations must have leadership for taking decisions. This is clearly not
true, however, because an organization can for instance be managed by agents
who issue commands which are not resulting from any known or specified, let
alone monitored, decision process. It is also possible to manage an organization
by having informal rules in place which to some extent allow subordinates to
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find out what they should do or say in order to please their leadership. In that
scenario the leadership may confine itself to issuing rather vague and abstract
declarations only, nowadays often called mission statements, which are subse-
quently interpreted by functionaries working at a lower level in the organization.
Decision free management is an effective form of management for relatively
small organizations.20
Decision free management may operate in many different flavors and styles,
and may adapt itself statically or even dynamically to different circumstances.
The two extreme forms are a top-down line of command and a loosely coordi-
nated collective of functional agents striving towards a common abstract goal.
Each decision free management style can be modified, and sometimes improved,
by introducing some forms of decision taking.
6.2 Implementing a decision mechanism
For a decision to occur or to be taken by some specific agent or by some group
of agents certain preconditions have to be met. Getting these preconditions
arranged amounts to implementing the very concept of a decision itself.
Thus implementing decisions takes place at a different level of abstraction
from the implementation (putting into effect) of specific decision outcomes. In
order to highlight that difference I propose to speak of “implementing a decision
mechanism” rather than of the equivalent “implementing decisions”. Boards,
management teams, councils, congresses, and so on each provide such arrange-
ments in different ways. I understand the ubiquitous presence of management
teams and boards of directors as an indication that a decision making struc-
ture has been put in place. Without any such structure decisions cannot be
taken, though perhaps equivalent actions (in terms of their consequences) can
be performed.
Why are organizations implementing decisions, in their different ways? The
need for decision taking arises from different arguments. Here is a brief and
non-exhaustive survey of such arguments.
Transparency. By having important actions arranged as the effect of decisions
the how and why of management activity becomes simpler to grasp for
external observers.
Fraud prevention. Properly logged decision processes allow external observers
and auditors to monitor the behavior of an organization, and to guaran-
tee that only permissible arguments are used for making choices and for
creating decisions.
20In The Netherlands, from some size onwards, an organization needs to maintain a works
council operating according to a Dutch law, the WOR (wet op de ondernemingsraden). In
an organization that uses decision free management in the absence of a works council, the
introduction of a works council may necessitate putting well-defined decision making protocols
in place at various levels of the organization. A works council interacts with management in
terms of a discourse about decisions, decision making and decision outcomes.
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Responsibility sharing. Very consequential actions can be based on the outcome
of group decision processes, with the benefit that individual participants
of the decision process need not carry the full weight of the responsibility
for the actions.
Speed control. Only by having a well-organized and well-monitored decision
process in place an organization can improve its responsiveness for a va-
riety of external requests and events.
Preventing tunnel vision. Small groups of individuals who are operating or
managing in a sustained flow of activity run the risk of getting caught in a
so-called tunnel vision: one one way ahead can be imagined. Whereas that
is true in an ordinary tunnel, it seldom applies to a more open problem
area. A well-organized decision process may prevent the occurrence of
leadership tunnel vision.
6.3 Decision quality
A most plausible application of decision taking theory is that it leads to agent
abilities, or conjectural abilities following [15], which enable the agent to im-
prove the quality of decisions to which it contributes by participating in the
decision taking process, or in the decision making process or in the decision
process. Defining decision quality emerges as a major objective in decision the-
ory development.21
A decision is of a higher quality (compared to another decision) if one or
more of the following criteria hold:
1. The effect of the decision outcome is more likely to correspond to the
decision taking agent’s intention. In other words the decision outcome
is more realistic. Unavoidably the operational context in which an agent
is active comes into play. By managing that context in such a way that
decision outcomes are more likely to have the intended impact the quality
of decisions improves, even if outcomes are formally identical. Indeed
quality assessment of decisions involves effects as well as outcomes.
2. The assumptions on which the motivation for a decision outcome is based
have been better validated.
3. The expected difference in terms of consequences between taking the de-
cision and not taking any decision at all (about the same theme in the
same context etc.) is higher.
21In [60] decision quality is distinguished from decision success, indeed quality measures
the likelihood of success rather than the success itself. In [5] decision quality is identified
with decision process quality, at the exclusion of decision outcome quality. However, decision
outcome in [5] corresponds to decision (outcome) effect in the current paper.
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4. The decision turns out to be (more) final rather than that it is to be
classified as (more) paving the way towards a subsequent decision22
5. The decision is closer to the most impacting decision that might have been
taken at the same moment of time by the same agent concerning the same
theme, with the same intentions in mind.23
6. The progression of the decision process that has led to the decision is more
in accordance with the protocol that must be followed for the particular
kind of decision at hand.
7. The decision process leading to the decision has made better use of avail-
able resources.
In [1] one finds the observation that there is a paradox hidden in the quest for
decision quality: if a decision process maker plans to involve different specialists
in the decision making process, the risk of disagreement increases. In particular
if the specialists are invited to think out of the box such disagreements may
flourish. That in turn may lead to conflict which subsequently decreases the
likelihood that decision outcomes induces the expected effects. From [1] one
may conclude that only if affective disagreement amongst staff members can be
avoided, decision quality profits from inviting staff to disagree on the substance
of choices that have to be made.
6.4 Decision making models
Literature abounds with models of decision making processes. Different models
may best fit different circumstances. A survey of models is given in [59] where
it is also claimed that model selection cannot be performed on the basis of gen-
erally agreed rational arguments, rather it is a matter of contingency. A classic
model is the garbage can model of [27]. The garbage can model incorporates
an architecture of a problem solving model into a model of a decision making
life-cycle.
The definition of decision taking presented above has no bias towards any
specific decision making model. To begin with the definition leaves open many
degrees of freedom for a definition of decision making. More importantly the
models exist at a higher level of abstraction where the rationale of different steps
constituting a decision making progression is qualified.
Besides decision making models there are organizational paradigms in which
decision making can play a more or less pronounced role. In [38] a paradigm
of organizational design is presented which centers around getting adequate de-
cision processes in place. The definition of decision taking is supposed to be
independent of organizational paradigms, though it must be sufficiently flexible
22This criterion includes a better robustness of the decision outcome against complaints and
legal objections, in other words, subsequent decision shaking is not plausible.
23It seems to be impossible to decouple the quality assessment of a decision from the inten-
tions of the deciding agent. If those intentions are unknown no quality assessment is possible.
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to deal with the various decision making workflows that a particular organiza-
tional paradigm might prescribe.
6.5 Levels of decision making and taking
An agent a which is involved in decision taking is confronted with the question
how many of its actions are decisions. If one drives by car to the state agent
in order to take a decision about the acquisition of some real estate, then one
may be tempted to reserve the phrases decision taking, decision making, and
decision process only to decision regarding real estate ownership, or with an
equal level of importance. Other activities like the car driving through dense
traffic or the preceding selection of a means of transportation take place at a
somewhat lower or at least different if not disjoint level of importance. These
other activities may involve decision taking as well. In the extreme every action
performed by the agent may be considered the consequence of the outcome of
some implicit or explicit decision. When, however, a level of abstraction and a
theme t has been chosen it becomes possible to distinguish between agent a’s
actions that are connected with decisions concerning t and other actions, which
then are not said to be part of the decision process, even when seen from the
perspective of another theme some of those actions are also to be classified as
decisions.
In a modular organization decisions are taken and made in different orga-
nizational modules concurrently. Encapsulation and abstraction are needed to
analyze to what extent decision taking activity and decision making progres-
sions occurring within a certain module can be influenced and observed from
different modules. Encapsulation and abstraction are notions which have been
given a quite precise meaning in process algebra (see [3]) and it will be a matter
of future work to develop these notions with a special focus on decision taking
and decision making.
6.6 Hierarchy of themes
Both for an agent and for an organization comprising many agents different
themes may be distinguished about which decision can occur. The simplest
picture is a hierarchy of importance, where decision processes of a higher im-
portance take place interleaved with process fragments in which decisions of
lower importance are taken. Unfortunately this hierarchy is a difficult matter
because so-called low level tasks may involve “go-no go” decisions to be taken
which are safety-critical, e.g. whether or not to make an outing in the mountains
on a given day or whether or not to make use of a car with a known technical
problem, whether or not to be transported by a driver who one does not really
trust, and so on.
The better picture may be that at the top level of the hierarchy there are
tactical decisions which are potentially safety-critical though lacking any strate-
gic importance. Below those there may be several independent layers of decision
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processes for various themes of strategic importance, such as stock market in-
vestment, real estate maintenance, job rotation, and family planning. Below
that is a vast number of processes involving necessary decisions which lack
strategic importance as well as any substantial risks, such as holiday timing,
choosing a restaurant, buying furniture, and the fulfillment of social obligations.
Below that there are processes which involve numerous choices that don’t qual-
ify as decisions such as when to do shopping, when to walk the dog, whether or
not to halt for some specific traffic light, when to stop filling one’s cup of coffee,
when to do some house keeping, where to buy a bottle of wine, which telecom
provider to use, when to reload one’s mobile phone and so on.
6.7 Hierarchical decision structure inside an organization
I will assume for the sake of simplicity that the management structure of some
organization is like a tree rather than the more usual matrix, where most nodes
are individual agents and some nodes consist of groups of agents, that is execu-
tives, managers, or disciplinary oriented employees. A hierarchy in the form of a
downwards hanging tree is probably too simple a model given the matrix orga-
nization that many organizations prefer, but it helps to visualize the complexity
of decision taking and making. I will assume that each agent occupies a single
node in the tree only, in some cases operating as a member of a group of agents.
One may rank individuals according to their distance to the top of the tree. The
chair operates at level 0, other members of the board operate at level 1, and so
on. Halfway the tree one finds the so-called middle management. Their role is
the most complex one. The picture given will be simplified in comparison to a
real case but it helps form an intuition.
Consider an agent a at level k > 2. At the level of a some types of decisions
are taken, perhaps with the help of agents of at least the same rank. Typically a
may be putting into effect a number of threads, by way of multi-threading with
a suitable strategic interleaving, one for each of the decisions to which a has a
commitment to bring it about by managing its preparation and then enacting
it to be taken. For a single prospective decision d, say of type D, agent a can
make use of an interface of actions ID, such actions may involve: planning a
meeting, asking a colleague for comment, writing a proposed decision outcome
for d, writing a preparatory proposed decision outcome for d, issuing a staff
member acting at level k + 1 or higher to perform one of these tasks, holding a
meeting, asking others to review a text and so on.
This leads to a processing a multi-thread for handling a plurality of decision
taking tasks. A the same time, however, a may be carrying out actions that may
be classified as decision making (though not taking) for decisions to be taken
at level k − 1, this again leading to a multi-thread of tasks for decisions which
will be taken by a’s immediate superiors (having rank below k by definition).
In addition a may be dealing with a multi-thread for tasks that play a role in
the decision process for decisions which are going to be taken at level k − 2.
Working at level k it is feasible for a, in principle to produce preparatory
work which may serve as an incentive for staff at levels below k (that is higher
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in the hierarchy in the sense of being closer to the top) to generate objectives
that may involve some decision taking at their level. Indeed some cases a can
be more influential by proposing ideas for decisions to be taken at higher levels
(lower k) and therefore by being involved in decision making but not in the
corresponding decision taking, than by deciding about issues that have been
determined as belonging to level k or higher (i.e. l > k).
Looking down in the power structure at each level decisions are taken for
which a carries some responsibility. Sometimes such decisions are taken in
response of questions emanating from a or from staff members or staff groups
with higher authority (that is having lower rank). In other cases these decisions
are taken without having been given a trigger from above in advance. That
takes place when a predefined workflow is put into effect and if that workflow
calls for a decision to be made.
The combination of these multithreads for each deciding agent is again put in
parallel by means of a strategic interleaving operator. This kind of composition
has been analyzed in detail in [18].
6.8 Conjectural abilities implied by the proposed theory
of decision taking
Following [15] awareness of an agent a of a theory of X may lead supporters
of that theory (amongst which its author(s)) to attribute conjectural abilities
concerning X to a.
The definition of the notion of decision and its surrounding notions can be
considered a theory of decision. Whatever its academic merits, awareness of
this theory may constitute an addition to an agents competence profile by way
of the acquisition of additional conjectural abilities. Theories of decision from
management science often focus on top level decision taking and supporting
processes. At top level, however, the question to what extent one is involved in
decision taking or making is often not felt as problematic.
Lower ranking staff members may have more difficulty in assessing their
place in an organization’s control system. For middle management the analysis
of decision may have some attraction, because it may be helpful for assessing
one’s contribution. Taking the agent a at management level k > 2 from the top
as an example the following conjectural abilities come to mind:
1. Being able to organize one’s participation in range of different decision
processes, by classifying this participation as being merely to the decision
process, to decision making, to decision taking, or even to decision shaking,
and by viewing these participations as threads in a hierarchical multi-
thread under control of a by means of strategic interleaving. (See [17, 18].)
2. Being aware of the variety of protocols that govern decision processes, as
well as of the meta decision processes that determine these protocols.
3. Being inclined to assess and to forecast and in some cases to influence the
quality of decisions made by agents at different levels.
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4. Being able to balance the participation to each of a plurality of decision
making threads in such a way that the agent’s influence is maximized.
5. Being aware that each participation to a decision process may be influen-
tial, in particular roles that are classified as decision making but not as
decision taking, and decision process roles that don’t qualify as decision
making roles.
6. For an agent operating at level k halfway the organization, the so-called
middle management roles: being aware that a’s participation, by being
involved in the full range of decision processes, may well be intrinsically
more complex than the participation of staff positioned at tope levels (0,
1, and perhaps 2), the so-called top-management.
7. Being aware that the quality of decision taking cannot be decoupled from
the planning of decision taking. The ability to forecast that a certain kind
of decision will turn out to be effective is an essential decision process
design capability. This ability need not be confined to so-called top man-
agement. That foresight may also appear as a decision making capability
or as a decision process making capability. Indeed, staff members at lower
levels of the hierarchy may well consciously trigger chains of events from
which decisions that will eventually be taken by higher management will
emerge, even if they don’t participate in either decision making or decision
taking, for that particular kind of decision.
8. Understanding in mechanical terms why a middle manager with a clear
sense of direction need not be less influential than a top manager without
a clear sense of direction. At the same time, given the non-empty sense of
direction aggregated at middle management level, understanding why top
management can often do with much less sense of direction than one might
expect. They only need to reinforce what pops up in terms of options for
decision making and decision taking.
9. Awareness of the fact that a decision it itself an activity which may be in
need of algorithmic control. An important part of preparatory work may
consist of the development of an instruction sequence, perhaps equipped
with conditions phrased in a short-circuit logic, or more generally a propo-
sition algebra (see [23]), which needs to be put into effect in real time in
order to compute the decision outcome that must to be produced. The
act of deciding, that is the decision (what else can it be), then reduces to
the decision to put an instruction sequence into effect.24
24At this point the concepts unfortunately become less clear. If an instruction sequence has
been determined in advance (as a part of decision making, or even merely as a part of the
preceding decision process) in order to compute the decision outcome when a decision, of a
particular kind, is taken, then one must distinguish two cases: (a) the instruction sequence is
put in to effect by “manual operation” by the decision taking agent, in which case the resulting
progression can be termed a decision without hesitation, provided it comes to an end, and (b)
the instruction sequence is put into effect by automatic means outside the agent’s immediate
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7 Concluding remarks
The first conclusion consists of a brief survey of informatics perspectives on de-
cision taking which summarizes the results of the paper concerning the concept
of decision making rather than decision taking.
7.1 Informatics perspectives on decision making
Besides providing a detailed definition of decision taking and providing a per-
spective on that from a viewpoint of informaticology the paper implicitly pro-
vides a description of decision making and an informaticological perspective on
that theme. Here is a summary of conclusions about decision making that may
be inferred from our discussions above.
• Description methods for: (decision outcome) typing, design and architec-
ture of decision processes, (decision process) protocols, modeling in time
of decision processes. Given more or less formalized descriptions of deci-
sion processes simulation, analysis, and verification can be made available
in the context of decision making.
• Protocol support for decision processes, for instance by way of providing
workflow models and assistance.
• Providing a mechanical perspective on decision thread effectuation in
terms of multi-threading with strategic interleaving. Multithreading al-
lows both the concurrent activity of different decision processes as eel as
the interleaving of decision processes with other threads of activity.
• Dedicated terminology for running processes: progression, trace of a thread,
concurrent operation, run of a machine, putting an instruction sequence
into effect, precondition, postcondition.
• Formulating real time aspects of decision taking in terms of preparatory
design of instruction sequences making use of conditions phrased in short-
circuit logic.25
• Decision making support systems: in practice many decision support sys-
tems mainly provide choice support, but all automated support for the
decision process design and decision process control may count as decision
making support.
• Conceptual clarification about the notion of a decision in relation to,
promise, imposition, suggestion, request etc.
control, in which case one may prefer to refer to the act of putting into effect as an implicit
decision, or even as no decision at all.
25This perspective is speculative at this moment, but if on the one hand conditions become
more complicated, and on the other hand the wish to limit energy consumption calls for
slower processing and even for giving up the guarantees of deterministic output by allowing
more impact of noise, then dynamic valuation of boolean expressions (as part of conditions)
becomes an unavoidable reality.
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7.2 Decision taking as a competence from informaticology
Under the assumption that a decision outcome is a piece of information, deci-
sion taking is an act of information production. Often decision taking merely
amounts to the promotion of a preliminary decision outcome, as produced dur-
ing decision preparation, to a definite status. Decision taking depends on various
concepts (competences, abilities) known from informaticology: adapting infor-
mation status, information classification, managing communication and even
broadcasting, managing information visibility, adherence to protocols, and in-
formation processing workflow. Further decision taking is often embedded in
a multi-threaded setting. Assuming in addition that choice, however sophisti-
cated in a practical case, plays a supportive role only, decision taking becomes
primarily a competence which to a significant extent belongs to informaticology.
7.3 Options for future work
Several options for further work can be imagined.26
1. A important issue is to clarify the relation between decision and promise.
Some promises are decisions and some decisions are promises. According
to many authors (e.g. [2], [54]), though not according to Burgess in [25, 26]
and several other works, a promise effects some obligation. The viewpoint
of Burgess has been elaborated in ample detail in [13], though yet without
development of a connection with decision taking.
2. Is decision taking a service which can be provided to other agents and
which for that reason can be outsourced? This matter may be productively
investigated as a sequel to the analysis of sourcing and outsourcing as given
in [15, 16].
3. Choice from a given menu of alternatives, and real time choice that in-
volves real time development of a potential course of action (for which I
propose to use the phrase “action determination”), both require further
conceptual analysis, in view of the idea that some, if not most, acts of
choice are not decisions. In similar vein voting must be analyzed in its
contras with decision taking.
4. Buying and selling are commonly assumed to involve decisions from both
parties. Working out a case study about decisions that play a role in buy-
ing and selling will constitute a relevant test of the conceptual framework
on decision taking that has been developed above.
5. Having defined decision taking rather meticulously, the question can be
posed which activities require decision taking and which activities don’t.
What are advantages and disadvantages for an agent of maintaining a self
imposed limitation to an episode of decision (taking) free activity?
26This section has been revised in 2014, having in mind the subsequent work on decision
taking that I have actually tried to carry out, however, no reference to such work is made in
order to avoid circular (self) referencing.
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6. Looking down in terms of the hierarchy to a decision process differs from
looking up to it. Decision processes by higher management layers seem to
make more sense to lower layers in a hierarchy than the other way around.
Higher management levels may be inclined to view decision processes at
lower levels as redundant and standing in the way of the real work. View-
ing upwards it is often the case that decisions are considered to be either
mistaken or delayed.
These matters can only be considered in detail once appropriate forms of
encapsulation (used for restricting remote influence on decision processes),
and abstraction (used for restricting the options for obtaining information
by a remote agent about a decision processes), have been adequately de-
veloped. I expect that the language of process algebra (see [3]), in which
encapsulation and abstraction pay a central role, will be helpful for devel-
oping an approach to this matter.
7. By regarding a decision to be an action (that is an act of decision taking)
rather than the output of an action I have proposed to disambiguate the
language one uses about decisions. This design decision about how to
use a language on decisions may be considered a step backward from
the perspective of the theory of concept images of [58]. Indeed if one
first develops a concept image about the notion of a decision one may
find contradicting aspects. Now [33], carrying on along the same lines,
concludes remarkably that persons able to deal in a flexible manner with
inconsistent concept images (for instance about limits of sequences and
about differentiation of real functions of a single variable) in the area
of elementary mathematics are better performers than those who in an
artificial manner apply refined and consistent concept images for the same
notions.
If a similar conclusion can be drawn about decision taking that will mean
that by assimilating our theory of decision taking and decision outcomes
(which I will call OODT for outcome oriented decision taking) a person
runs the risk of artificially creating a coherent concept image for decision
making and as a consequence that person’s ability for decision making
may be reduced. Obviously it is important to find out such matters before
advertising OODT as a practical tool.
8. From a philosophical perspective one may ask if process product ambiguity
is an essential feature of the concept of a decision rather than an accidental
one. If so then resolving that ambiguity in either way will create larger
problems than it solves. Is there some form of tradeoff in this area? Is
it possible that for some fields of decision taking the OODT perspective
is helpful whereas for other areas a so-called proceptual view in the sense
of [58] is unavoidable on philosophical grounds?
9. In [15, 16] process product ambiguity is considered an issue for outsourc-
ing, and a preference has been formulated for a process interpretation of
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outsourcing, that is viewing outsoucing as an action or a process that
modifies a so-called sourcement, thereby producing a new sour cement as
its outcome. Many authors, however, view outsourcing as a specific kind
of sour cement, that is a product (of an outsourcing process rather than
the process itself). Whether or not attempts at resolving process product
ambiguities for widely used notions are useful at all remains to bee seen.
In particular the question may be posed if resolving such ambiguities for
terms with less ubiquitous use should be tried out. A possible simpler case
of an ambiguity is in the notion of a fraction: as a procept a fraction sig-
nifies at the same time the result of a division, that is a rational number,
and a particular notation for that outcome. Moving from this inconsis-
tent concept image (in the sense of [58]) to a consistent one (an attempt
made for instance in [52]) may be considered a relevant case study, that
might precede an exercise in disambiguating concept image refinement for
decision taking.
Undeniably last three issues constitute fundamental questions, if not doubts,
concerning the rationale of my efforts towards conceptual clarification and cor-
responding definition of decisions.
References
[1] A.C. Amason. Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional
conflict on strategic decision making: resolving a paradox for top man-
agement teams. The Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 39 (1) pp.
123–148, (1996).
[2] P.S. Atiyah. Promises, morals and law. Clarendon Press, Oxford. (2003).
[3] J.C.M. Baeten, T. Basten and M.A. Reniers. Process Algebra: Equational
Theories of Communicating Processes. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical
Computer Science. Vol. 50, (2009).
[4] H.T. Barney, G.C. Low, and A. Aurum. The morning after: what happens
when outsourcing relationships end? In: G.A. Papadopoulos et. al. eds.
Information Systems Development, Springer LLC, pp. 637–644 (2009)
[5] C. Bayley and S. French. Designing a participatory process for stakeholder
involvement in a societal decision? Group Decision and Negotiation Vol.
17 pp. 195–210 (2007)
[6] J.A. Bergstra. Formaleuros, formalcoins and virtual monies. arXiv:1008.
0616 [cs.CY], (2010).
[7] J.A. Bergstra. Informal Control Code Logic. arXiv:1009. 2902 [cs.PL],
(2010).
[8] J.A. Bergstra. Real Islamic Logic. arXiv:1103.4515 [cs.LO], (2011).
41
[9] J.A. Bergstra. Informatics Perspectives on Decision Taking.
arXiv:1112.5840v1 [cs.OH], (2011).
[10] J.A. Bergstra. Putting Instruction Sequences into Effect. arXiv:1110.1866
[cs.PL], (2011).
[11] J.A. Bergstra. Informaticology, combining computer science, data science,
and fiction science. arXiv:1210.6636 [cs.SE], (2012).
[12] J.A. Bergstra and M. Burgess. A static theory of promises.
arXiv:0810.3294 [cs.MA], (2008).
[13] J.A. Bergstra and M. Burgess. Promise theory, principles and applications
χtAxis Press, ISBN-10: 1495437779 (2014).
[14] J.A. Bergstra andM.E. Loots. Program algebra for sequential code. Journal
of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 51 (2), pp.125–156, (2002).
[15] J.A. Bergstra, G.P.A.J. Delen, and S.F.M. van Vlijmen. Outsourcing Com-
petence. arXiv:1109.6536 [cs.OH], (2011).
[16] J.A. Bergstra, G.P.A.J. Delen, and S.F.M. van Vlijmen. Stratified Out-
sourcing Theory. arXiv:1110.1957 [cs.SE], (2011).
[17] J.A. Bergstra and C.A. Middelburg. Thread algebra for strategic interleav-
ing. Formal Aspects of Computing, 19 (4) pp. 445–474, (2007).
[18] J.A. Bergstra and C.A. Middelburg. Thread algebra with multi-level strate-
gies. Fundamenta Informaticae 71(2/3), pp. 153–182 (2006).
[19] J.A. Bergstra and C.A. Middelburg. Machine structure oriented control
code logic. Acta Informatica, 46 (5) pp. 375–401, (2009).
[20] J.A. Bergstra and C.A. Middelburg. Instruction sequence processing oper-
ators. Acta Informatica, 49 (3) pp. 139–172, (2012).
[21] J.A. Bergstra and A. Ponse. Execution architectures for program algebra.
Journal of Applied Logic, 5 (1) pp. 170–192, (2007).
[22] J.A. Bergstra and A. Ponse. A progression ring for interfaces of instruction
sequences, threads and services. arXiv:0909.2839 [cs.PL], (2009).
[23] J.A. Bergstra and A. Ponse. Proposition Algebra. ACM Transactions on
Computational Logic, Vol. 12 (3) Article 31 (36 pages), (2011).
[24] M. Bommer, C. Gratto, J. Gravander, and M. Tuttle. A Behavioral Model
of Ethical and Unethical Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.
6 pp. 265–280 (1987).
[25] M. Burgess. An approach to understanding policy based on autonomy and
voluntary cooperation. in: Ambient Networks, Springer LNCS, Vol 3775
pp. 97–108, (2005).
42
[26] M. Burgess. System administration and the scientific method. in: J.A.
Bergstra and M. Burgess (editors), Handbook of Network and System Ad-
ministration, pp. 689–728, (2007).
[27] D.K. Cohen, J.G. March, and J.P. Olsen. A garbage can model of organi-
zational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 17 pp. 1–25, (1972).
[28] R.M. Cyert, H.A. Simon, and D.B. Trow. Observation of a business deci-
sion. The Journal of Business, Vol. 29 (4) pp. 237–248, (1956).
[29] G.P.A.J. Delen. Decision and Control Factors for IT-sourcing. in: J. A.
Bergstra and M. Burgess (editors), Handbook of Network and System ad-
ministration: pp. 929–946, (2007).
[30] J.W. Dyckman Planning and decision theory. Journal of the American
planning Association, Vol. 27 (4) pp. 335–345 (2010).
[31] A. Etzioni. Normative-affective factors: toward a new decision making
model. Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 9 pp. 125–150 (1988).
[32] V.H. Fried and R.D. Hirsch. Toward a model of venture capital investment
decision making. Financial Management, Vol. 23 (3) pp. 28–37 (1994).
[33] E.M. Gray and D. Tall. Duality, ambiguity, and flexibility: a “perceptual”
of simple arithmetic. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, Vol.
25 (2) pp. 116–140 (1994).
[34] M.B. Folsom. Executive Decision Making. McGraw Hill, New York, (1962).
[35] J. Hage. Theories of Organizations: Form, Process and Transformation.
Willey, New York, (1994).
[36] H.A. Heatfield and J. Wyatt. Philosophies for the design and development
of clinical decision-support systems. Methods of Information in Medicine,
Vol 32, pp 1–8 (1993).
[37] D.J. Hickson. Decision-Making at the Top of Organizations. Annual review
of sociology, Vol. 13, pp. 165–192, (1987)
[38] G.P. Huber and R.R. McDaniel. The decision-making paradigm of organi-
zational design. Management Science, Vol. 32 (5), pp. 572–589, (1994).
[39] R.C. Jeffrey. Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy
of Science, Vol. 22 (3) pp. 247–249, (1956).
[40] R.L. Keeney. Creativity in Decision Making with Value-Focused Thinking.
Sloan Management Review, summer 1994, pp. 33–41, (1994).
[41] K. Kimbler and L.G. Bouma (Eds.) Feature interactions in telecommuni-
cations and software systems V. IOS Press, (1998).
43
[42] D. Mahalel, D. Zaidel, and T. Klein. Driver’s decision process on termina-
tion of the green light. Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 17 (5)
pp. 373–380 (1985).
[43] J.E. McConnell. The export decision: an empirical study of firm behavior.
Economic Geography, Vol. 55 (3) pp 471–183 (1998).
[44] C.A. Middelburg. Searching publications on software testing.
arXiv:1008.2647 [cs.SE], (2010).
[45] B.A. Mellers, A. Schwartz and A.D.J Cooke. Judgement and decision mak-
ing. Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 49 pp 447–477 (1998).
[46] P.C. Nutt. Making decision-making research matter: some issues and reme-
dies. Management Research Review, Vol. 34 (1) pp. 5–15 (2011).
[47] M.J. O’Fallon and K.D. Butterfield. A review of the empirical ethical
decision-making literature. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 59, pp. 375–
413 (2005).
[48] T. Parsons. On the concept of political power. Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, Vol. 107 (3) pp. 232–262 (1963).
[49] C. Peltz. Web services orchestration and choreography. Computer, Vol. 36
(10) pp. 286–295 (2009).
[50] R.C. Pinto. Argumentation and the force of reasons. Informal Logic, Vol.
29 (3) pp. 46–52 (2003).
[51] D.A. Rosati. Developing a systematic decision-making framework: bu-
reaucratic politics in perspective. World Politics, Vol. 33 (2) pp. 234–252
(1981).
[52] S. Rollnik. Das pragmatische Konzept fu¨r den Bruchrechen-unterricht.
Dissertation Univ. Flensburg, www.zhb-flensburg.de/dissert/rollnik/
dissertation-flensburg-rollnik.pdf, (2009).
[53] T.L. Saaty. Decision making with the analytic hierarchy process. Int.
Journal of Services Sciences, Vol. 1 (1) pp. 83–98 (2008).
[54] H. Sheinman. Introduction: promises and agreements. in Ed. H. Sheinman,
Promises and Agreements, Oxford University Press. pp. 3–57 (2011).
[55] D. Simon. A third view of the black box: cognitive coherence in legal
decision making. The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 71 (2) pp.
511–586 (2004)
[56] H.A. Simon. Administrative decision making. Public Administration Re-
view, Vol. 25. (1) pp. 31–37 (1965)
44
[57] P. Suppes. The philosophical relevance of decision theory. The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 58. (21) pp. 605–614 (1961)
[58] D. Tall and S. Vinner. Concept image and concept definition in mathemat-
ics with particular reference to limits and continuity. Educational Studies
in Mathematics, Vol. 12 (2) pp. 151–169 (1981).
[59] C.J. Tarter andW.K. Hoy. Toward a contingency theory of decision making.
Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 36 (3) pp. 212–228 (1998).
[60] S.G. Trull. Some factors involved in determining total decision success.
Management Science, Vol. 12 (6) pp. 270–280 (1966).
[61] M. Valdman. Outsourcing Self-Government. Ethics, Vol. 120. (4) pp. 761–
790 (2010)
[62] D. Vickers. Time, ignorance, surprise and economic decisions: a comment
on Williams and Findlay’s “Risk and the role of failed expectations in an
uncertain world”. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 9. (1) pp.
48–57 (1986)
[63] W. Wallach, S. Franklin, and C. Allen. A conceptual and computational
model of moral decision making in human and artificial agents. Topics in
Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, pp.454–485 (2010).
[64] B.N. Waller. Classifying and Analyzing Analogies. Informal Logic, Vol. 21
(3), pp.199–218 (2001).
[65] D. Walton and F. Macagno. Defeasible classifications and inferences from
definitions. Informal Logic, Vol. 30 (1) pp. 34–61 (2010).
[66] R.A. Westbrook, J.W. Newman, and J.R. Taylor. Satsifac-
tion/dissatisfaction in the purchase decision process. Journal of Marketing,
October 1978, pp. 54–66 (1978).
45
